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Abstract—In Private Information Retrieval (PIR), one wants to
download a file from a database without revealing to the database
which file is being downloaded. Much attention has been paid
to the case of the database being encoded across several servers,
subsets of which can collude to attempt to deduce the requested
file. With the goal of studying the achievable PIR rates in realistic
scenarios, we generalize results for coded data from the case of
all subsets of servers of size t colluding, to arbitrary subsets of
the servers. We investigate the effectiveness of previous strategies
in this new scenario, and present new results in the case where
the servers are partitioned into disjoint colluding groups.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Private Information Retrieval (PIR), a user is interested
in obtaining the data in an entry of an online database,
while keeping private which entry she is interested in. A
straightforward solution that achieves perfect privacy consists
of the user downloading the whole database. In their seminal
paper [1], [2], Chor et al. introduced the concept of PIR and
devised PIR schemes with substantially lower communication
cost (sublinear in the size of the database) that achieve perfect
privacy in an information theoretic sense. The key idea was
to replicate the database on multiple servers and assume that
the servers do not collude. Clearly, if the data is accessible
only from a single server, there is no better scheme than
downloading the whole database for achieving (information
theoretic) perfect privacy.
Replication-based PIR: Since its introduction, PIR has re-
ceived ample attention, and the literature has focused mainly
on minimizing the (total) communication cost in the repli-
cated databases model. In recent breakthrough results, PIR
schemes with subpolynomial communication cost have been
constructed for multiple servers [3], [4], [5] and later for two
servers [6].
Coding-based PIR: Furthermore, there has been a growing
interest in studying PIR schemes for coded data, due to the
savings in the storage overhead compared to mere replication.
Shah et al. showed in [7] that only one extra bit download
is needed to achieve privacy when the data is coded on
an exponentially large number of servers. Blackburn et al.
achieved the same low download complexity with a linear
number of servers [8]. Fazeli et al. [9] focused on the design
of codes that minimize the storage overhead of PIR and
provided a method to transform any linear replication-based
PIR scheme into a scheme for coded data. In addition to
various constructions, the fundamental limits on the download
cost of PIR schemes have been characterized for replicated
data [10] and coded data [11].
Collusion: In replication-based PIR, the model that has
received most attention is non-colluding servers. Here the
assumption is that the nodes (e.g., servers) do not communicate
and are therefore only aware of the query they received
from the user. Distributed storage systems on the other hand
depend upon communication between nodes to facilitate repair
functions. This motivated investigating PIR in the context
of limited collusion, i.e., a subset of servers can share their
knowledge in an attempt to deduce the user’s request. We refer
to this as t-PIR, meaning that any subset of up to t servers is
allowed to collude. The capacity for t-PIR has been established
in [12]. For coded t-PIR the capacity is yet unknown, but
[13] described a first scheme for t-PIR on coded databases
employing a maximum distance separable (MDS) code. In
[14] this scheme was extended to a wider set of parameters
and an algebraic framework was established, also resulting in
a conjecture for the coded t-PIR capacity.
Contributions: To the best of our knowledge we present the
first work on PIR schemes on coded data for arbitrary collusion
patterns. We describe a strategy that employs a t-PIR scheme
for a minimal t, for any given collusion pattern. We continue to
examine some special cases of collusion patterns that allow for
a more tailored approach that increases the rate significantly.
Most notable is the case of the collusion pattern not being
connected, that is, being contained in a partition of the set
of nodes. In this case an approach that resembles schemes
for collusion-free PIR can be utilized and almost equally high
rates achieved. This case is of special interest since it can
represent server groups that are geographically or otherwise
separated.
II. PRELIMINARY DEFINITIONS
Let us describe the distributed storage systems we consider;
this setup follows that of [13], [14], [11]. To provide clear
and concise notation, we have consistently used superscripts
to refer to files, subscripts to refer to servers, and parenthetical
indices for entries of a vector. So, for example, the query qij
is sent to the jth server when downloading the ith file, and
yj(a) is the a
th entry of the vector stored on server j.
Suppose we have files x1, . . . , xm ∈ Fkq . The considered
data storage scheme proceeds by arranging the files into an
m× k matrix
X =
[
x1
...
xm
]
=
[
x1(1) ··· x1(k)
...
. . .
...
xm(1) ··· xm(k)
]
. (1)
Each file xi is encoded using a linear [n, k, d]-code C with
length n, dimension k, and minimum distance d, and having
generator matrix GC , into an encoded file y
i = xiGC . In
matrix form, we encode the matrix X into a matrix Y by
right-multiplying by GC :
Y = XGC =
[
y1
...
ym
]
= [ y1 ··· yn ] . (2)
The jth column yj ∈ Fmq of the matrix Y is stored by the j
th
server. Such a storage system allows d−1 servers to fail while
still allowing users to successfully access any of the files xi.
If C is an MDS code, the resulting distributed storage system
is maximally robust against server failures.
Definition 1: Suppose we have a distributed storage system
as above, where m files are stored across n servers. A PIR
scheme for such a storage system consists of:
1. For each index i ∈ [m], a probability space (Qi, µi) of
queries. When the user wishes to download xi, a query
qi ∈ Qi is selected randomly according to the probability
measure µi. Each qi is itself a tuple qi = (qi1, . . . , q
i
n),
where qij will be sent to the j
th server. Here, qij is a
function that takes the content of server j as input, and
returns one symbol in the alphabet of the code.
2. Responses rij = q
i
j(yj) which the servers compute and
transmit to the user.
3. A reconstruction function which takes as inputs the rij
and returns some c coordinates of the ith file.
We call a set T ⊆ [n] a collusion set if it is possible for the
servers indexed by T to share their requests in an attempt to
deduce the index of the requested file. We denote the collection
of all colluding sets T , and call it a collusion pattern. Clearly,
any subset of a colluding set is again colluding, and so T is
closed under inclusion, or in combinatorial terms an abstract
simplicial complex. We can therefore describe T by its set
of maximal elements, and we write T = 〈T1, · · · , Tr〉 if
T1, · · · , Tr are the maximal colluding sets.
Definition 2: A collusion pattern T is disconnected if
there exist non-empty disjoint sets T1 and T2 such that
T ⊆ 〈T1, T2〉.
Definition 3: A PIR scheme protects against the colluding
set T = {j1, . . . , jt} ⊆ [n] if we have
I(qij1 , . . . , q
i
jt
; i) = 0 (3)
where I(· ; ·) denotes the mutual information of two random
variables. In other words, there exists a probability distribution
(QT , µT ) such that, for all i ∈ [m], the projection of (Qi, µi)
to the coordinates in T is (QT , µT ). Hence, the servers in T
will not learn anything about the index i of the file that is
being requested. A PIR scheme that protects against all sets
in a collusion pattern T is said to be T -secure.
Clearly, if S ⊆ T , then any PIR scheme that protects
against T also protects against S. Moreover, if S ⊆ T are
two collusion patterns, then any T -secure PIR scheme is also
S-secure.
For the rest of this paper we will exclusively consider linear
schemes that use uniform distributions, as in the following
fundamental example.
Example 1: Let n = 2 servers each store a copy of a
database consisting of m files xℓ ∈ Fq. To retrieve the ith file
the user chooses uniformly at random an element u in Fmq and
constructs the queries as qi = (qi1, q
i
2) = (u, u+ei). The space
of all queries therefore is given by Qi = {(x, y) : y−x = ei}
and µi = 1
qn
is the uniform probability measure. The responses
rij := 〈x, q
i
j〉 are calculated as the inner product of the database
with the requests and reconstruction is achieved by subtraction
of the responses, xi = ri2 − r
i
1.
This scheme is {{1}, {2}}-secure, as both projections of any
query space Qi onto a coordinate are identical to the complete
ambient space Fnq with uniform measure. It does not, however,
protect against collusion in {1, 2}, as the two servers between
them can observe the index i from the difference between their
query vectors.
III. A GENERIC PIR SCHEME FOR COLLUDING SETS
In this section we briefly summarize the methods of [14],
which constructed explicit PIR schemes for the case where
T = {T : |T | ≤ t}
def
=
(
n
≤t
)
, meaning that all of the subsets
of [n] of size t are colluding. A scheme that is a
(
n
≤t
)
-secure
will be called a t-PIR scheme. The crucial ingredients to the
PIR schemes discussed in [14] are the following: the storage
code C ⊆ Fn, another linear code D of the same length n as
C, and the star product
C ⋆D = span{[c(1)d(1), . . . , c(n)d(n)] ∈ Fn : c ∈ C, d ∈ D}
of the linear codes C and D, which is again a linear code of
length n. The main theorem of [14] is the following:
Theorem 1 ([14]): Given a storage code C and a linear
code D as above, there exists a linear PIR scheme for the
distributed storage system Y = XGC with rate (dC⋆D−1)/n
which protects against all colluding sets of size dD⊥ − 1.
The schemes in [13] and [14] allow to retrieve linear
combinations of files, or even parts of different files. For
simplicity we will henceforth restrict to the case where a single
file is retrieved.
To privately retrieve a file xi, for every file xℓ in the
database a codeword dℓ is chosen uniformly at random from
the code D. A vector e /∈ D is then added to di. The query
qij ∈ F
m sent to the j:th server is then
qij = [d
1(j), . . . , di(j) + e(j), . . . , dm(j)]
and the servers respond with
[ri1, . . . , r
i
n] = [〈q
i
1, y1〉, . . . , 〈q
i
n, yn〉] ∈ C ⋆ D + C ⋆ e.
The support of e is then chosen so that decoding the vector
[ri1, . . . , r
i
n] to its closest neighbor in C ⋆D reveals dC⋆D − 1
coordinates of yi, coming from the C⋆e summand in the above
expression. We will refer to the above as a (D, e)-retrieval
scheme, where D and e are as above.
Example 2: Suppose that 1 ≤ t ≤ n − k. By choosing C
andD to both be generalised Reed-Solomon (GRS) codes with
the same evaluation vector, the (D, e)-retrieval scheme of [14]
can achieve a rate of
n−(k+t−1)
n
while protecting against all
colluding sets of size t. See [14] for more details.
Example 3: Suppose we let D = Rep(n)q be the repetition
code of length n over F. A corresponding (D, e)-retrieval
scheme then admits a particularly simple description, first
described in [13]. Specifically, pick a vector u ∈ Fm uniformly
at random. To server j = 1, . . . , n, send the query
qij =
{
u+ ei if j ∈ supp(e)
u otherwise
where ei is the i:th standard basis vector. The vector r
consisting of all the responses satisfies
r = [ri1, . . . , r
i
n] ∈ C ⋆ Rep(n) + C ⋆ e = C + C ⋆ e
because C ⋆ Rep(n) = C. Thus provided | supp(e)| < dC ,
the (D, e)-retrieval scheme has rate n−k
n
. However, it only
protects against colluding sets of size t = 1, that is, no non-
trivial collusion. This strategy works for any linear code C.
Hence, in the case where all t-sets are colluding, the
(Rep, e)-scheme from Example 3 is only secure in the trivial
case of t = 1. However, we will see in Corollary 1 that
for partial collusion, the repetition code plays a much more
prominent role.
IV. PARTIAL COLLUSION
In general, the security of the (D, e)-retrieval scheme de-
pends upon the following observation.
Proposition 1: The PIR scheme in [14] is secure against
collusion of the set T , if the projection of the vector e lies in
the projection of D, i.e., eT ∈ D|T .
Proof: The query for any file that is not requested is a
uniform vector d ∈ D. The colluding servers in the set T
see a projection of these codewords onto their coordinates,
hence a uniform element in D|T . The security relies on in-
distinguishability of the query for non-requested and requested
files. It follows that the PIR scheme is secure if d+eT ∈ D|T .
As D|T is a linear code, this is equivalent to the condition
eT ∈ D|T .
Corollary 1: Let the storage code C be MDS. There is a
vector e such that the (Rep, e)-retrieval scheme is T -secure
and has positive retrieval rate if and only if T is disconnected.
Proof: Assume that the (Rep, e)-retrieval scheme has
positive retrieval rate. In particular, we must have e /∈ Rep,
as otherwise the response vector would be in C ⋆ Rep = C,
and would be annihilated when decoding with C⊥. Let T1 =
{i ∈ [n] : e(i) = e(1)}. By construction 1 ∈ T1, so T1 is non-
empty. On the other hand, as e is not in the repetition code,
the set T2 = T
c
1 = {i ∈ [n] : e(i) 6= e(1)} is also non-empty.
If the (Rep, e)-scheme is T -secure, then eT is a repetition
vector for all T ∈ T , so in particular T can not intersect both
T1 and T2. Thus T is a disconnected collusion pattern.
On the other hand, let T ⊆ 〈T1, T2〉 be a disconnected
collusion pattern, where T1 and T2 are non-empty sets with
T1 ∩ T2 = ∅. Let
e(i) =
{
1 if i ∈ T1
0 if i ∈ T0.
Then we retrieve a vector from (C ⋆ e)C⊥. Since C ⋆ e 6⊆ C,
this code has positive rank, so there is non-trivial information
downloaded.
Corollary 2: If the (D, e)-retrieval scheme is a t-PIR
scheme, then dim(D) is at least t.
Proof: Assume dim(D) < t and let I be an information
set, i.e., |I| = dim(D) andD|I is of full rank. The coordinates
eI uniquely determine a codeword d from D, if we consider
the collusion sets I ∪ j for all j ∈ [n] we see that for at least
one such set e(j) 6= d(j), because otherwise we would have
e ∈ D.
V. SOLVING PARTIAL COLLUSION USING t-PIR
For any collusion set T , we can let t be the largest size of
a colluding set in T . Then, T ⊆
(
n
≤t
)
, so we get a T -secure
retrieval scheme from the
(
n
≤t
)
-secure scheme in the previous
section.
In [14], [13] it was shown that t-PIR schemes achieve rates
of n−k−t+1
n
if the storage code C is of dimension k and
properly chosen. We are now interested in variations of T
for which a different strategy leads to capacity gains.
We begin with an instructive example, adapted from [14]:
Example 4: Consider the [5, 2]-storage code where each file
xi is divided into two blocks xi(1) and xi(2), and distributed
onto the five servers via right-multiplication by the generator
matrix:
GC =
[
1 0 4 3 2
0 1 2 3 4
]
This is a GRS storage code of rank 2 over any field of
characteristic ≥ 5. If we let D be the matrix
GD :=
[
1 1 1 1 1
0 1 2 3 4
]
.
and e = (1, 1, 0, 0, 0), then the (D, e)-retrieval scheme has the
following explicit expression:
The queries qi sent to the servers are the following vectors
in Fm5 :
q
i
1 = [z
1(1) , . . ., zm(1)] +ei
q
i
2 = [z
1(1) + z1(2) , . . ., zm(1) + zm(2)] +ei
q
i
3 = [z
1(1) + 2z1(2) , . . ., zm(1) + 2zm(2)]
q
i
4 = [z
1(1) + 3z1(2) , . . ., zm(1) + 3zm(2)]
q
i
5 = [z
1(1) + 4z1(2) , . . ., zm(1) + 4zm(2)]
(4)
where ei is the i
th standard basis vector, and zi(1) and
zi(2) are random elements in F5. The servers now respond by
projecting their stored data onto the query vector. It is shown
in [14] how these responses can be used to decode both blocks
from the desired file xi. Observe that for each pair of servers,
the corresponding joint distribution of queries is the uniform
distribution over (Fm5 )
2. However, as a bonus, the same is true
for the joint distribution of (q3, q4, q5). Hence, the described
scheme is T -secure, where T =
(
5
≤2
)
∪ {{3, 4, 5}}.
More generally, consider the (D, e)-retrieval scheme used to
protect against collusion of all t-sets, as in Example 2 and call
the support of the vector e the information set supp(e) = I .
It is obvious that any colluding set S that is disjoint from I
can not recover any information, as qij does not depend on i
for j ∈ S. Therefore, the (D, e)-retrieval scheme also protects
against the collusion pattern T =
(
n
≤t
)
∪ P(I). We use this
insight to describe an optimal information set to use t-PIR for
arbitrary collusion.
Let [n] be the set of servers and T be the collection of
collusion sets. Let I be an arbitrary information set such that
|I| ≤ n− k − t+ 1, (5)
where t := max{|T | : T ∈ T and T ∩ I 6= ∅}. As in
Example 4, a t-PIR schemes that uses such an I as an
information set can protect against the collusions in T . If the
inequality (5) is not sharp, we can furthermore puncture both
C and D in n− k− t+1− |I| points outside the information
set. This reduces the number n of servers, while all other
parameters are preserved, and hence the rate is increased. This
gives us the following result.
Lemma 1: For a given collusion pattern T we can download
the symbols from I at a rate of r(I, t) = |I||I|+k+t−1 , where I
and t are as in (5).
The rate in Lemma 1 is clearly increasing in |I| when t is
fixed. For fixed t, we can choose I = It of maximal size by
assigning
I˜t
def
= [n] \
⋃
T∈T ,|T |>t
T. (6)
We then let It = I˜t if |I˜t| ≤ n− k− t+ 1, and otherwise we
let It be an arbitrary (n− k − t+ 1)-element subset of I˜t.
To exploit Lemma 1 to download an entire file, we need
there to be a subset S ⊆ [n] on which C has full rank, such
that S does not intersect any colluding sets of size > t. In other
words, the code C has to have full rank on I˜t. In fact, we can
download an entire file at the rate of Lemma 1 if and only if
C has full rank on I˜t. Indeed, assume that C has full rank on
I˜t, and that the file is subdivided into r
def
= |I˜t| blocks, each
of which is encoded via C. Then we can repeat the (D, e)
download scheme k times, each time downloading one new
coded symbol from each block, such that all the downloaded
symbols are from I˜t. Hence, we use the same code D but
different vectors e in each round. Details on how to do this
in the more restrictive setting of t-PIR are given in [13]. Note
that, if the storage code C is MDS, then the criterion that C
has full rank on I˜t is equivalent to |I˜t| ≥ k.
From the scheme described above, together with Lemma 1,
the following theorem follows:
Theorem 2: Let C be an MDS storage code, and let T be a
collusion pattern. Let t be a positive integer such that |I˜t| ≥ k,
where I˜t is as defined in (6). Then, we can download files
privately from C at rate
min
{
|I˜t|
|I˜t|+ k + t− 1
,
n− k − t+ 1
n
}
.
Proof: Let I ⊆ I˜t be such that |I| ≤ n − k − t+ 1. By
Lemma 1, we can download symbols from I privately at a rate
r(I, t) = |I||I|+k+t−1 . From the scheme described preceding
this theorem, we can then download entire files at this rate, as
k ≤ |I˜t|. If we select I = It, we get
|I|
|I|+ k + t− 1
= min
{
|I˜t|
|I˜t|+ k + t− 1
,
n− k − t+ 1
n
}
by construction. This proves the theorem.
It remains to select the optimal value of t. To this end,
observe that I˜t is an increasing set in t. In particular, there
exists a largest value tc of t such that |I˜t| ≤ n − k − t + 1.
Observe that when t ≥ tc , then
r(It, t) =
n− k − t+ 1
n
is decreasing in t, and when t ≥ tc , then
r(It, t) =
I˜t
I˜t + k + t− 1
is increasing in t. As a consequence, maximizing the rate r(It)
amounts to finding tc, which we do by successively decreasing
t from t0 = max{|T | : T ∈ T }.
Example 5: Consider a [6, 2]-storage code and let T =
〈{1, 2}, {3, 4, 5, 6}〉. Then I˜2 = I˜3 = {1, 2} and I˜4 = [6].
As |I˜3| = 2 ≤ n − k − t + 1 and |I˜4| = 6 > n − k − t + 1,
we get tc = 2. Therefore, the rate obtained by protecting
against 4-collusion is not optimal, but can be improved by
using a 2-PIR scheme, where the information set is selected
to be I2 = {1, 2}. The PIR scheme can now be applied to any
subset of the servers of size It + k + t− 1 = 5, as long as it
contains I2. Choosing not to use the 6
th node at all, we can
achieve a rate of r(I2, 2) =
2
2+2+2−1 =
2
5 .
VI. PARTITIONS OF COLLUDING SETS
Next, we will discuss the case where the maximal elements
of T are a partition of the set [n] of servers. This means that
there is a collection T1, · · · , Tr of colluding sets, such that no
collusion is happening between Ti and Tj when i 6= j. We
begin with an example suggesting how to improve the scheme
from Section V.
Example 6: Let C be an MDS storage code on n = 6 nodes,
and T be generated by the sets {1, 2, 3}, {4, 5, 6}. Using a 3-
PIR scheme we could achieve a rate of n−t−k+16 =
4−k
6 . For
k = 3, using a 3-PIR scheme would thus allow the user to
download 1 part per subquery, achieving a rate of 16 . On the
other hand, using a scheme of the form (Rep, e), the user
would be able to download the whole file, i.e. 3 parts in one
query. A sketch of the scheme applied is shown below.
Suppose the files are stored using an (n, k)-MDS code, and
the user wants file xf . The user can then send a random vector
u to one set of colluding nodes, say to nodes 1, 2, and 3, and
send u+ ef to the nodes 4, 5, and 6.
The user will then decode the randomness, i.e. the projection
of the random vectors, from the responses of nodes 1, 2, 3.
Then, substituting these in the responses from nodes 4, 5, and
6, will give the user 3 independent equations in xf (1), xf (2),
and xf (3), thus allowing her to decode the file xf .
This achieves rate 36 =
1
2 .
In general, consider the case where D = Repn is the
repetition code, as in Corollary 1. In this case, the query vector
e must be chosen to be constant on each colluding set T ∈ T .
The (D, e)-retrieval scheme to obtain file xi will then retrieve
a uniformly random vector from C ⋆ Rep+xi(C ⋆ e). After
decoding this with a generator matrix for (C ⋆Rep)⊥ = C⊥,
the decoded vector will be
xi(C ⋆ e)C⊥ = xi(C Diag(e)C⊥). (7)
Here, Diag(e) is the n × n diagonal matrix with the vector
e on the diagonal, and by abuse of notation, we use C and
C⊥ to denote some chosen generator matrix and parity check
matrix for the code C, respectively. From (7), it follows that
the number of downloaded symbols is
rk(C Diag(e)C⊥) ≤ min{k, w(e), n− k},
where w(e) = | supp(e)| is the weight of the vector e. It
also follows that we may without loss of generality assume
that e is a 0-1-vector, since multiplying Diag(e) with a non-
degenerate diagonal matrix does not change the rate of the
composed matrix.
After possibly reordering the coordinates, we may assume
that e = [1, · · · , 1, 0, · · · , 0] has ones in the first w = w(e)
coordinates, and zeroes in the last n−w(e) coordinates. If C is
an MDS storage code, we may also assume that the generator
matrices are chosen such that
C = [I,M ] and C⊥ =
[
MT
−I
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−k
.
Assuming w(e) ≥ k, we then get
Diag(e) · C⊥ =

 MT−Iw(e)−k 0
0 0

 ,
with zeros in the n−w(e) last rows. The first w(e)−k columns
of Diag(e)·C⊥ agree with those of C⊥, so will be annihilated
when left-multiplied with C. It follows that the rank of (C ⋆
e)C⊥ is not more than n−w(e). On the other hand, the last
n−w(e) columns in Diag(e) ·C⊥ are not orthogonal to C, so
we have rk((C ⋆ e)C⊥) = n−w(e) if n−w(e) ≤ k ≤ w(e)
We have thus proven the following.
Theorem 3: Let C be an MDS storage code. Then the
(Rep, e)-retrieval scheme has rate
min{k, n− k, w(e), n− w(e))}
n
.
Applying this scheme in the case where the collusion pattern
is a partition, we want to maximize min{w(e), n − w(e)},
subject to e being constant on each collusion set. In other
words, supp(e) has to be a union of collusion sets, of size as
close to n/2 as possible. The following result is immediate,
and describes the important case where the coding rate of C
is at least 1/2, or in other words k ≥ n− k:
Theorem 4: Let T ⊆ 〈T1, T2〉 be a collusion pattern where
T1 and T2 are disjoint sets, each of size ≤ k. Then there exists
a vector e such that the (Rep, e)-retrieval pattern has retrieval
rate n−k
n
.
In the special cases where k < n − k, another subtlety
occurs. In such cases, it is favorable to subdivide the files into
so-called stripes, following the ideas in [15]. This allows us to
simultaneously download several stripes of the same file, each
of which has size k, thereby circumventing the k/n lower
bound for the retrieval rate. The key elements of this is shown
in the example below.
Example 7: Let n = 9 and k = 3 and T be generated
by the sets {1, 2, 3}, {4, 5, 6}, {7, 8, 9}. Here, we notice that
it would be helpful to split our files into 2 stripes. The entire
data matrix is thus a k × 2m matrix
X =

 x1(1, 1) x1(1, 2) . . . xm(1, 1) xm(1, 2). . . . . .
x1(k, 1) x1(k, 2) . . . xm(k, 1) xm(k, 2)

 .
Suppose the user wants file xf . The user can then send a
random vector u to one set of colluding nodes, say to nodes
1, 2, and 3, send u+ e2f−1 to the nodes 4, 5, and 6, and send
u+ e2f to the nodes 7, 8, and 9.
The user will then decode the randomness, i.e. the pro-
jection of the random vectors, from the responses of nodes
1, 2, 3. Then, substituting these in the responses from nodes
4, 5, and 6, will give the user 3 independent equations in
xf (1, 1), xf (2, 1), and xf (3, 1), thus allowing him/her to
decode the first stripe of the file xf . Doing the same with
the responses from nodes 6, 7, and 8, user can decode the
second stripe of the file. Thus, the user will decode the file
xf in one query.
This achieves rate 69 =
n−k
n
, extending the result from
Theorem 4 to the case where k < n− k.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have studied private information retrieval schemes for
data encoded across several servers, wherein an arbitrary
collection of subsets of the servers are colluding. We applied
the so-called (D, e)-retrieval scheme from [14], which protects
against the collusion of all subsets of a given size t, to
the present case of arbitrary collusion pattern. By carefully
choosing the information set I and the amount of collusion
t to protect against, we can offer an improvement in the
PIR rate over the naive strategy of using a (D, e)-retrieval
scheme to protect against the largest colluding set. Finally, we
investigated achievable PIR rates when the sets of colluding
servers form a partition of the set of all servers. Future work
will consist of deriving precise expressions for the achievable
rates for arbitrary collusion patterns.
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